[forum-prof] conflitos internacionais recentes (deveriam estar no boletim da UFRJ!), conferência na China sobre administração universitária e a residência universitária na UFRJ

[Luiz Felipe Coelho]

Colegas

Estive lendo minha caixa de e-mails e vejo três 
temas importantes, que podem interessar: 
conflitos internacionais recentes (deveriam estar 
sendo debatidos no boletim da UFRJ!), conferência 
na China sobre administração universitária e um 
artigo sobre residência universitária na UFRJ.

Acho interessante o debate sobre o conflito 
israelense-palestino e me impressiono da UFRJ não 
ter colocado nada sobre ele no último boletim. 
Esse conflito desnorteia as questões tradicionais 
das esquerdas e das direitas brasileiras e 
mundiais. (O brazilianist Thomas Skidmore se 
referia à "esquerda brasileira" como "as 
esquerdas" pois pouco a unia e acho que todos 
concordam que o mesmo pode ser dito da nossa direita, são "as direitas".)

Outro conflito internacional interessante é o 
russo-ucraniano envolvendo o fornecimento de gás 
natural, com muitos pontos de contato com o 
conflito boliviano-brasileiro. Questões de 
logística, comércio internacional são evidentes 
em ambos os casos, e também na rrecente invasão 
da Geórgia pela Rússia, onde um dos objetivos 
principais foi inviabilizar um gasoduto 
alternativo azerbaijano-georgiano-turco.

Um terceiro conflito internacional perigoso e 
importante é o paquistanês-indiano. Um artigo no 
último número da revista "Physics Today", da 
American Physical Society, estimava que na 
eventualidade de uma guerra nuclear 
Índia-Paquistão (um evento possível e muitos 
diriam justificável, numa retaliação indiana ao 
recente atentado terrorista em Mumbai feito por 
um grupo paquistanês que rotineiramente faz 
atentados na Índia) com cerca de 100 bombas da 
potência da jogada pelos americanos em Hiroshima, 
haveria a  morte de 44 milhões de pessoas, além 
de alterações climáticas globais. Os otimistas 
diriam que isso é tão ruim que levará a um 
equilíbrio de terror, como na Guerra Fria. 
(Parece ruim mas em outras simulações, felizmente 
bem menos prováveis, como um conflito 
russo-americano ou americano-chinês, o cenário é 
bem mais sombrio, com um único submarino 
americano podendo matar 120 milhões de chineses.) 
O artigo, bem assustador, segue ao final deste 
mail, mas sem os gráficos (quem desejar pode 
xerocar o artigo comigo, eu tenho a revista como membro da APS).

Considerando que temos na UFRJ habilitações de 
hebraico, de árabe e de russo no bacharelado de 
Letras e que temos cursos de Ciências Políticas, 
de História, de Geografia, de Sociologia, de 
Direito, de Engenharia Nuclear, de Meteorologia 
(essencial numa guerra nuclear e na questão do 
aquecimento global) e de Relações Internacionais, 
certamente temos especialistas para debates sobre 
esses três conflitos, ou pelo menos artigos no Boletim da UFRJ.

Estes conflitos mostram a importância de não 
enfraquecer a ONU, como a política externa 
americana tradicionalmente deseja (a invasão de 
Kosovo, ainda no governo Clinton, foi feita à 
revelia da ONU, assim como a do Iraque no governo 
Bush). Além disso temos a história de 6 décadas 
de vetos a decisões do Conselho de Segurança da 
ONU, vetos esses que são o principal responsável 
pelo tamanho e duração desse conflito 
israelense-palestino. E agora é pior, deixar um 
conflito num território como Gaza, com um terço 
do tamanho e da população do município do Rio de 
Janeiro, contribuir para destruir a ONU é de uma 
miopia sem tamanho e isto não é anti-americanismo!

Falando no boletim da UFRJ o último boletim tem 
um artigo muito interessante sobre a Residência 
Universitária na UFRJ: 
http://www.olharvirtual.ufrj.br/2006/index.php?id_edicao=235&codigo=14 
com um planejamento estratégico de nosso futuro.

Repasso também um aviso de um evento na China 
sobre administração universitária para 
excelência. Não sei se o evento é bom, mas pelo 
menos a proposta é interessante. As taxas são 
calculadas em euros, isto diz algo sobre a 
economia mundial! Quem tiver alguns milhares de reais poderá ir lá.

Abraços, Felipe Coelho
===
A) Conferência sobre qualidade na administração iuniversitária
>From: wcu at sjtu.edu.cn
>Sender: wcu at sjtu.edu.cn
>To: coelho at if.ufrj.br
>Date: 6 Jan 2009 17:37:18 +0800
>Subject: Call for papers for the 3rd 
>International Conference on World-Class 
>Universities, 2 to 4 November 2009, Shanghai, China
>
>Dear Colleagues,
>
>The Center for World-Class Universities of 
>Shanghai Jiao Tong University is pleased to 
>announce that the 3rd International Conference 
>on World-Class Universities (WCU-3) will be held 
>from 2 to 4 November 2009 in Shanghai, China. 
>Attached please find the first circular of the conference.
>
>
>WCU-3 will emphasize the institutional 
>perspective in managing and building world-class 
>universities. More specifically this should reflect the following issues:
>    *  Strategic planning and leadership of 
> elite higher education institutions;
>    *  Global market and institutional policies 
> for the promotion of academic talent;
>    *  Quality assurance in the context of 
> undergraduate and graduate education;
>    *  Institutional initiatives for research 
> excellence and innovation and technology;
>    *  Institutional responses for 
> accountability: internal evaluation and benchmarking;
>    *  Role of elite universities in national 
> higher education and research systems.
>WCU-3 will include a special event during which 
>will be presented by Center for World-Class 
>Universities of Shanghai Jiao Tong University the following rankings:
>
>Academic Ranking of World Universities – 2009;
>Academic Ranking of World Universities by Broad Subject Fields  2009; and
>  Academic Ranking of World Universities by 
> Subject Fields – 2009 [new ranking by subject 
> fields, proposed subject fields include 
> chemistry, physics, mathematics, computer 
> science and engineering, and economics].
>
>Participants interested in presenting a 
>contribution on one of above-mentioned topics 
>are kindly asked to submit an abstract of up to 
>2,000 words by April 1, 2009. For further 
>information, please look at our meeting website: 
><http://gse.sjtu.edu.cn/WCU/WCU-3.htm>http://gse.sjtu.edu.cn/WCU/WCU-3.htm
>
>Sincerely,
>
>Conference Secretariat
>Center for World-Class Universities
>Graduate School of Education
>Shanghai Jiao Tong University
>Shanghai, China
>
>Email: <mailto:wcu at sjtu.edu.cn>wcu at sjtu.edu.cn
>
>[]
>
>
>[]
===============================
B) O artigo da Physics Today de dezembro de 2008 
sobre as consequências de uma guerra nuclear indiano-paquistanesa

Environmental consequences of nuclear war

A regional war involving 100 Hiroshima-sized 
weapons would pose a worldwide threat due to 
ozone destruction and climate change. A 
superpower confrontation with a few thousand weapons would be catastrophic.

Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock, and Richard P. Turco
December 2008, page 37

More than 25 years ago, three independent 
research groups made valuable contributions to 
elaborating the consequences of nuclear warfare.1 
Paul Crutzen and John Birks proposed that massive 
fires and smoke emissions in the lower atmosphere 
after a global nuclear exchange would create 
severe short-term environmental aftereffects. 
Extending their work, two of us (Toon and Turco) 
and colleagues discovered “nuclear winter,” which 
posited that worldwide climatic cooling from 
stratospheric smoke would cause agricultural 
collapse that threatened the majority of the 
human population with starvation. Vladimir 
Aleksandrov and Georgiy Stenchikov conducted the 
first general circulation model simulations in 
the USSR. Subsequent investigations in the mid- 
and late 1980s by the US National Academy of 
Sciences2 and the International Council of 
Scientific Unions3,4 supported those initial 
studies and shed further light on the phenomena 
involved. In that same period, Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the 
potential environmental damage attending the use 
of nuclear weapons and devised treaties to reduce 
the numbers from their peak in 1986—a decline 
that continues today. When the cold war ended in 
1992, the likelihood of a superpower nuclear 
conflict greatly decreased. Significant arsenals 
remain, however, and proliferation has led to 
several new nuclear states. Recent work by our 
colleagues and us5–7 shows that even small 
arsenals threaten people far removed from the 
sites of conflict because of environmental 
changes triggered by smoke from firestorms. 
Meanwhile, modern climate models confirm that the 
1980s predictions of nuclear winter effects were, 
if anything, underestimates.8

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) 
of 2002 calls for the US and Russia each to limit 
their operationally deployed warheads to 
1700–2200 by December 2012. The treaty has many 
unusual features: warheads, rather than delivery 
systems, are limited; verification measures are 
not specified; permanent arsenal reductions are 
not required; warheads need not be destroyed; 
either side may quickly withdraw; and the treaty 
expires on the same day that the arsenal limits 
are to be reached. Nevertheless, should the 
limits envisioned in SORT be achieved and the 
excess warheads destroyed, only about 6% of the 
70?000 warheads existing in 1986 would remain. 
Given such a large reduction, one might assume a 
concomitant large reduction in the number of 
potential fatalities from a nuclear war and in 
the likelihood of environmental consequences that 
threaten the bulk of humanity. Unfortunately, 
that assumption is incorrect. Indeed, we estimate 
that the direct effects of using the 2012 
arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of 
fatalities. The indirect effects would likely 
eliminate the majority of the human population.

Casualty and soot numbers

Any of several targeting strategies might be 
employed in a nuclear conflict. For example, in a 
“rational” war, a few weapons are deployed 
against symbolically important targets. 
Conversely, a “counterforce” war entails a 
massive attack against key military, economic, 
and political targets. We consider a 
“countervalue” strategy in which urban areas are 
targeted, mainly to destroy economic and social 
infrastructure and the ability to fight and 
recover from a conflict. In any case, when the 
conflict involves a large number of weapons, the 
distinction between countervalue and counterforce 
strategies diminishes because military, economic, 
and political targets are usually in urban areas.

Box 1 on page 38 describes how we estimate 
casualties (fatalities plus injuries) and soot 
(elemental carbon) emissions; figure 1 shows 
results. The figure gives predicted casualties 
and soot injected into the upper atmosphere from 
an attack on several possible target countries by 
a regional power using 50 weapons of 15-kiloton 
yield, for a total yield of 0.75 megaton. The 
figure also provides estimates of the casualties 
and soot injections from a war based on 
envisioned SORT arsenals. In the SORT conflict, 
we assume that Russia targets 1000 weapons on the 
US and 200 warheads each on France, Germany, 
India, Japan, Pakistan, and the UK. We assume the 
US targets 1100 weapons each on China and Russia. 
We do not consider the 1000 weapons held in the 
UK, China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and 
possibly North Korea. (Box 2 on page 40 provides 
information on the world’s nuclear arsenals.) The 
war scenarios considered in the figure bracket a 
wide spectrum of possible attacks, but not the 
extremes for either the least or greatest damage that might occur.

Box 2

As figure 1 shows, a war between India and 
Pakistan in which each uses weapons with 0.75-Mt 
total yield could lead to about 44 million 
casualties and produce about 6.6 trillion grams 
(Tg) of soot. A SORT conflict with 4400 nuclear 
explosions and 440-Mt total yield would generate 
770 million casualties and 180 Tg of soot. The 
SORT scenario numbers are lower limits inasmuch 
as we assumed 100-kt weapons; the average SORT 
yield would actually be larger. The results can 
be relatively insensitive to the distribution of 
weapons strikes on different countries because 
attacks on lower-population areas produce 
decreased amounts of soot. For instance, 100 
weapons targeted each on France and Belgium leads 
to about the same amount of soot as 200 on France 
alone. On the other hand, using fewer weapons on 
densely populated regions such as in India and 
China would reduce soot generation.

The 4400 explosions that we considered are 1000 
more than are possible with the lower SORT limit. 
However, even if the US and Russia achieve that 
lower limit, more probable weapons yields would 
produce soot emissions and casualties similar to 
those just described. Because of world 
urbanization, a SORT conflict can directly affect 
large populations. For example, with 1000 weapons 
detonated in the US, 48% of the total population 
and 59% of the urban population could fall within 
about 5 km of ground zero; 20% of the total 
population and 25% of the urban population could 
be killed outright, while an additional 16% of 
the total population and 20% of the urban population could become injured.


Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates how the number of casualties 
and fatalities and the amount of soot generated 
in China, Russia, and the US rises with an 
increasing number of 100-kt nuclear explosions. 
In generating the figure, we assumed regions were 
targeted in decreasing order of population within 
5.25 km of ground zero, as described in box 1. 
Attacks on China had the most dire effects 
because China has many highly populated urban 
centers. Indeed, attacks on a relatively small 
number of densely populated urban targets 
generate most of the casualties and soot. For 
example, 50% of the total soot produced by a 
2000-weapon attack would result from 510 
detonations on China, 547 on Russia, or 661 on 
the US. A single US submarine carrying 144 
warheads of 100-kt yield could generate about 23 
Tg of soot and 119 million casualties in an 
attack on Chinese urban areas or almost 10 Tg of 
soot and 42 million casualties in an attack on Russian cities.

In the late 1980s, Brian Bush, Richard Small, and 
colleagues assessed soot emissions in a nuclear 
conflict.9 Their work, independent of the studies 
with which two of us (Toon and Turco) were 
engaged, involved a counterforce attack on the US 
by the USSR. They assumed 500-kt weapons aimed at 
3030 specific targets such as US Army, Navy, and 
Air Force bases, fuel storage locations, 
refineries, and harbors, but not missile silos or 
launch-control facilities. Cities were not 
explicitly attacked in their counterforce 
scenario, but in the end, 50% of the US urban areas were destroyed.

Bush and colleagues estimated 37 Tg of smoke 
emissions, which contain not only light-absorbing 
black soot but also nonabsorbing organics and 
other compounds whose effects on climate are 
smaller than that of soot. Using our methodology 
for estimating fire emissions, which includes 
accounting for soot that is rained out, we 
calculate their result as being equivalent to 
about 21 Tg of soot emission. In our simulated 
countervalue attack with 1000 weapons of 100-kt 
yield, we found that 28 Tg of soot was generated. 
Our burned area is somewhat larger, which 
accounts for the greater soot emission. In short, 
both scenarios affect similar urban areas and 
generate similar amounts of soot.

However, Bush and colleagues assumed 3 times as 
many weapons and 15 times the total explosive 
yield that we assumed. Because of multiple 
targeting and overlap of detonation zones, their 
scenario has a built-in fire ignition redundancy 
factor of about 8.7; our model has negligible 
redundancy. In fact, their analysis of 3030 
specific targets identified only 348 unique, 
non-overlapping detonation sites in the US. That 
substantial level of overkill is symptomatic of 
the enormous excesses of weapons deployed by the superpowers in the 1980s.

Environmental effects of soot

Figure 3a

Figure 3a indicates changes in global average 
precipitation and temperature as a function of 
soot emission, as calculated with the help of a 
modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A 
relatively modest 5 Tg of soot, which could be 
generated in an exchange between India and 
Pakistan, would be sufficient to produce the 
lowest temperatures Earth has experienced in the 
past 1000 years—lower than during the 
post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the 
so-called year without a summer. With 75 Tg of 
soot, less than half of what we project in a 
hypothetical SORT war, temperatures would 
correspond to the last full Ice Age, and 
precipitation would decline by more than 25% 
globally. Calculations in the 1980s had already 
predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg soot 
injection to be quite large.3 Our new results, 
however, show that soot would rise to much higher 
altitudes than previously believed—indeed, to 
well above the tops of the models used in the 
1980s. As a result, the time required for the 
soot mass to be reduced by a factor of e is about 
five years in our simulations, as opposed to 
about one year as assumed in the 1980s. That 
increased lifetime causes a more dramatic and longer-lasting climate response.

The temperature changes represented in figure 3a 
would have a profound effect on mid- and 
high-latitude agriculture. Precipitation changes, 
on the other hand, would have their greatest 
impact in the tropics.6 Even a 5-Tg soot 
injection would lead to a 40% precipitation 
decrease in the Asian monsoon region. South 
America and Africa would see a large diminution 
of rainfall from convection in the rising branch 
of the Hadley circulation, the major global 
meridional wind system connecting the tropics and 
subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulation’s 
dynamics can, in general, affect climate on a global scale.

Complementary to temperature change is radiative 
forcing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b 
shows how nuclear soot changes the radiative 
forcing at Earth’s surface and compares its 
effect to those of two well-known phenomena: 
warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 
1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the 
largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial 
Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the 
energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient forcing 
from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about -4 
W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). 
One implication of the figure is that even a 
regional war between India and Pakistan can force 
the climate to a far greater degree than the 
greenhouse gases that many fear will alter the 
climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, the 
durations of the forcings are different: The 
radiative forcing by nuclear-weapons-generated 
soot might persist for a decade, but that from 
greenhouse gases is expected to last for a 
century or more, allowing time for the climate 
system to respond to the forcing. Accordingly, 
while the Ice Age–like temperatures in figure 3a 
could lead to an expansion of sea ice and 
terrestrial snowpack, they probably would not be 
persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets.

Figure 4

Agriculture responds to length of growing season, 
temperature during the growing season, light 
levels, precipitation, and other factors. The 
1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural 
changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such 
studies have been conducted using modern climate 
models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the 
decrease in length of the growing season—the time 
between freezing temperatures—for the second 
summer after the release of soot in a nuclear 
attack.6,8 Even a 5-Tg soot injection reduces the 
growing season length toward the shortest average 
range observed in the midwestern US corn-growing 
states. Earlier studies concluded that for a 
full-scale nuclear conflict, “What can be said 
with assurance .?.?. is that the Earth’s human 
population has a much greater vulnerability to 
the indirect effects of nuclear war [including 
damage to the world’s agricultural, 
transportation, energy, medical, political, and 
social infrastructure], especially mediated 
through impacts on food productivity and food 
availability, than to the direct effects of 
nuclear war itself.” As a result, “The indirect 
effects could result in the loss of one to several billions of humans.”4

Because the soot associated with a nuclear 
exchange is injected into the upper atmosphere, 
the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric 
circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injection 
associated with a regional conflict, 
stratospheric temperatures would remain elevated 
by 30 °C after four years.6–8 The resulting 
temperature and circulation anomalies would 
reduce ozone columns by 20% globally, by 25–45% 
at middle latitudes, and by 50–70% at northern 
high latitudes for perhaps as much as five years, 
with substantial losses persisting for an 
additional five years.7 The calculations of the 
1980s generally did not consider such effects or 
the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they 
focused on the direct injection of nitrogen 
oxides by the fireballs of large-yield weapons 
that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models 
have only recently become capable of performing 
the sophisticated atmospheric chemical 
calculations needed to delineate detailed 
ozone-depletion mechanisms. Indeed, simulations 
of ozone loss following a SORT conflict have not yet been conducted.

Policy implications

Scientific debate and analysis of the issues 
discussed in this article are essential not only 
to ascertain the science behind the results but 
also to create political action. Gorbachev, who 
together with Reagan had the courage to initiate 
the builddown of nuclear weapons in 1986, said in 
an interview at the 2000 State of the World 
Forum, “Models made by Russian and American 
scientists showed that a nuclear war would result 
in a nuclear winter that would be extremely 
destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge 
of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of 
honor and morality, to act in that situation.” 
Former vice president Al Gore noted in his 2007 
Nobel Prize acceptance speech, “More than two 
decades ago, scientists calculated that nuclear 
war could throw so much debris and soot into the 
air that it would block life-giving sunlight from 
our atmosphere, causing a ‘nuclear winter.’ Their 
eloquent warnings here in Oslo helped galvanize 
the world’s resolve to halt the nuclear arms race.”

Many researchers have evaluated the consequences 
of single nuclear explosions, and a few groups 
have considered the results of a small number of 
explosions. But our work represents the only 
unclassified study of the consequences of a 
regional nuclear conflict and the only one to 
consider the consequences of a nuclear exchange 
involving the SORT arsenal. Neither the US 
Department of Homeland Security nor any other 
governmental agency in the world currently has an 
unclassified program to evaluate the impact of 
nuclear conflict. Neither the US National Academy 
of Sciences, nor any other scientific body in the 
world, has conducted a study of the issue in the past 20 years.

That said, the science community has long 
recognized the importance of nuclear winter. It 
was investigated by numerous organizations during 
the 1980s, all of which found the basic science 
to be sound. Our most recent calculations also 
support the nuclear-winter concept and show that 
the effects would be more long lasting and 
therefore worse than thought in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, a misperception that the 
nuclear-winter idea has been discredited has 
permeated the nuclear policy community. That 
error has resulted in many misleading policy 
conclusions. For instance, one research group 
recently concluded that the US could successfully 
destroy Russia in a surprise first-strike nuclear 
attack.10 However, because of nuclear winter, 
such an action might be suicidal. To recall some 
specifics, an attack by the US on Russia and 
China with 2200 weapons could produce 86.4 Tg of 
soot, enough to create Ice Age conditions, affect 
agriculture worldwide, and possibly lead to mass starvation.

Lynn Eden of the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation explores the military 
view of nuclear damage in her book Whole World on 
Fire.11 Blast is a sure result of a nuclear 
explosion. And military planners know how to 
consider blast effects when they evaluate whether 
a nuclear force is capable of destroying a 
target. Fires are collateral damage that may not 
be planned or accounted for. Unfortunately, that 
collateral damage may be capable of killing most of Earth’s population.

Climate and chemistry models have greatly 
advanced since the 1980s, and the ability to 
compute the environmental changes after a nuclear 
conflict has been much improved. Our climate and 
atmospheric chemistry work is based on standard 
global models from NASA Goddard’s Institute for 
Space Studies and from the US National Center for 
Atmospheric Research. Many scientists have used 
those models to investigate climate change and 
volcanic eruptions, both of which are relevant to 
considerations of the environmental effects of 
nuclear war. In the past two decades, researchers 
have extensively studied other bodies whose 
atmospheres exhibit behaviors corresponding to 
nuclear winter; included in such studies are the 
thermal structure of Titan’s ambient atmospheres 
and the thermal structure of Mars’s atmosphere 
during global dust storms. Like volcanoes, large 
forest fires regularly produce phenomena similar 
to those associated with the injection of soot 
into the upper atmosphere following a nuclear 
attack. Although plenty remains to be done, over 
the past 20 years scientists have gained a much 
greater understanding of natural analogues to nuclear-weapons explosions.

Substantial uncertainties attend the analysis 
presented in this article; references 5 and 8 
discuss many of them in detail. Some 
uncertainties may be reduced relatively easily. 
To give a few examples: Surveys of fuel loading 
would reduce the uncertainty in fuel consumption 
in urban firestorms. Numerical modeling of large 
urban fires would reduce the uncertainty in smoke 
plume heights. Investigations of smoke removal in 
pyrocumulus clouds associated with fires would 
reduce the uncertainty in how much soot is 
actually injected into the upper atmosphere. 
Particularly valuable would be analyses of 
agricultural impacts associated with the climate 
changes following regional conflicts.

For any nuclear conflict, nuclear winter would 
seriously affect noncombatant countries.12 In a 
hypothetical SORT war, for example, we estimate 
that most of the world’s population, including 
that of the Southern Hemisphere, would be 
threatened by the indirect effects on global 
climate. Even a regional war between India and 
Pakistan, for instance, has the potential to 
dramatically damage Europe, the US, and other 
regions through global ozone loss and climate 
change. The current nuclear buildups in an 
increasing number of countries point to conflicts 
in the next few decades that would be more 
extreme than a war today between India and 
Pakistan. The growing number of countries with 
weapons also makes nuclear conflict more likely.

The environmental threat posed by nuclear weapons 
demands serious attention. It should be carefully 
analyzed by governments worldwide—advised by a 
broad section of the scientific community—and widely debated by the public.

Much of the research we have summarized is based 
on computations done by Charles Bardeen of 
casualties and the amount of soot generated in 
several hypothetical nuclear attacks. We thank 
our colleagues Georgiy Stenchikov, Luke Oman, 
Michael Mills, Douglas Kinnison, Rolando Garcia, 
and Eric Jensen for contributing to the recent 
scientific investigation of the environmental 
effects of nuclear conflict on which this paper 
is based. This work is supported by NSF grant ATM-0730452.

Brian Toon is chair of the department of 
atmospheric and oceanic sciences and a member of 
the laboratory for atmospheric and space physics 
at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Alan 
Robock is a professor of atmospheric science at 
Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
Rich Turco is a professor of atmospheric science 
at the University of California, Los Angeles.

References
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(1982); R. P. Turco et al., Science 222, 1283 
(1983) [INSPEC]; V. V. Aleksandrov, G. L. 
Stenchikov, On the Modeling of the Climatic 
Consequences of the Nuclear War: Proceedings on 
Applied Mathematics, Computing Center, USSR 
Academy of Sciences, Moscow (1983).
2. Committee on the Atmospheric Effects of 
Nuclear Explosions, The Effects on the Atmosphere 
of a Major Nuclear Exchange, National Academy 
Press, Washington, DC (1985), available online at [Link].
3. A. B. Pittock et al., Environmental 
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5. O. B. Toon et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys. 7, 1973 (2007).
6. A. Robock et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys. 7, 2003 (2007).
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Geophys. Res. 112, D13107 (2007) [SPIN]; doi:10.1029/2006JD008235.
9. B. W. Bush et al., Nuclear Winter Source-Term 
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the United States, vol. 6, rep. no. 
DNA-TR-86-220-V6, Defense Nuclear Agency, 
Alexandria, VA (1991); R. D. Small, Ambio 18, 377 (1989).
10. K. A. Lieber, D. Press, Int. Secur. 30(4), 7 (2006).
11. L. Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, 
Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation, 
Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, NY (2003).
12. C. Sagan, Foreign Aff. 62, 257 (1983/84).
13. P. Miller, M. Mitchell, J. Lopez, Phys. Geog. 26, 85 (2005) .
14. S. Glasstone, P. J. Dolan, The Effects of 
Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed., US Department of 
Defense and the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, Washington, DC (1977), online at [Link].
15. R. P. Turco et al., Science 247, 166 (1990) [INSPEC].
16. T. A. Postol, in The Medical Implications of 
Nuclear War, F. Solomon, R. Q. Marston, eds., 
National Academy Press, Washington, DC (1986), p. 15.
17. A. Robock et al., EOS Trans. Am. Geophys. Union 88, 228 (2007) .

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