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Colegas<br><br>
Estive lendo minha caixa de e-mails e vejo três temas importantes, que
podem interessar: conflitos internacionais recentes (deveriam estar sendo
debatidos no boletim da UFRJ!), conferência na China sobre administração
universitária e um artigo sobre residência universitária na
UFRJ.<br><br>
Acho interessante o debate sobre o conflito israelense-palestino e me
impressiono da UFRJ não ter colocado nada sobre ele no último boletim.
Esse conflito desnorteia as questões tradicionais das esquerdas e das
direitas brasileiras e mundiais. (O brazilianist Thomas Skidmore se
referia à "esquerda brasileira" como "as esquerdas"
pois pouco a unia e acho que todos concordam que o mesmo pode ser dito da
nossa direita, são "as direitas".) <br><br>
Outro conflito internacional interessante é o russo-ucraniano envolvendo
o fornecimento de gás natural, com muitos pontos de contato com o
conflito boliviano-brasileiro. Questões de logística, comércio
internacional são evidentes em ambos os casos, e também na rrecente
invasão da Geórgia pela Rússia, onde um dos objetivos principais foi
inviabilizar um gasoduto alternativo
azerbaijano-georgiano-turco.<br><br>
Um terceiro conflito internacional perigoso e importante é o
paquistanês-indiano. Um artigo no último número da revista "Physics
Today", da American Physical Society, estimava que na eventualidade
de uma guerra nuclear Índia-Paquistão (um evento possível e muitos diriam
justificável, numa retaliação indiana ao recente atentado terrorista em
Mumbai feito por um grupo paquistanês que rotineiramente faz atentados na
Índia) com cerca de 100 bombas da potência da jogada pelos americanos em
Hiroshima, haveria a morte de 44 milhões de pessoas, além de
alterações climáticas globais. Os otimistas diriam que isso é tão ruim
que levará a um equilíbrio de terror, como na Guerra Fria. (Parece ruim
mas em outras simulações, felizmente bem menos prováveis, como um
conflito russo-americano ou americano-chinês, o cenário é bem mais
sombrio, com um único submarino americano podendo matar 120 milhões de
chineses.) O artigo, bem assustador, segue ao final deste mail, mas sem
os gráficos (quem desejar pode xerocar o artigo comigo, eu tenho a
revista como membro da APS).<br><br>
Considerando que temos na UFRJ habilitações de hebraico, de árabe e de
russo no bacharelado de Letras e que temos cursos de Ciências Políticas,
de História, de Geografia, de Sociologia, de Direito, de Engenharia
Nuclear, de Meteorologia (essencial numa guerra nuclear e na questão do
aquecimento global) e de Relações Internacionais, certamente temos
especialistas para debates sobre esses três conflitos, ou pelo menos
artigos no Boletim da UFRJ. <br><br>
Estes conflitos mostram a importância de não enfraquecer a ONU, como a
política externa americana tradicionalmente deseja (a invasão de Kosovo,
ainda no governo Clinton, foi feita à revelia da ONU, assim como a do
Iraque no governo Bush). Além disso temos a história de 6 décadas de
vetos a decisões do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, vetos esses que são o
principal responsável pelo tamanho e duração desse conflito
israelense-palestino. E agora é pior, deixar um conflito num território
como Gaza, com um terço do tamanho e da população do município do Rio de
Janeiro, contribuir para destruir a ONU é de uma miopia sem tamanho e
isto não é anti-americanismo!<br><br>
Falando no boletim da UFRJ o último boletim tem um artigo muito
interessante sobre a Residência Universitária na UFRJ:
<a href="http://www.olharvirtual.ufrj.br/2006/index.php?id_edicao=235&codigo=14" eudora="autourl">
http://www.olharvirtual.ufrj.br/2006/index.php?id_edicao=235&codigo=14</a>
com um planejamento estratégico de nosso futuro.<br><br>
Repasso também um aviso de um evento na China sobre administração
universitária para excelência. Não sei se o evento é bom, mas pelo menos
a proposta é interessante. As taxas são calculadas em euros, isto diz
algo sobre a economia mundial! Quem tiver alguns milhares de reais poderá
ir lá.<br><br>
Abraços, Felipe Coelho<br>
===<br>
A) Conferência sobre qualidade na administração iuniversitária<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">From: wcu@sjtu.edu.cn<br>
Sender: wcu@sjtu.edu.cn<br>
To: coelho@if.ufrj.br<br>
Date: 6 Jan 2009 17:37:18 +0800<br>
Subject: Call for papers for the 3rd International Conference on
World-Class Universities, 2 to 4 November 2009, Shanghai, China<br><br>
Dear Colleagues,<br><br>
The Center for World-Class Universities of Shanghai Jiao Tong University
is pleased to announce that the <b>3rd International Conference on
World-Class Universities (WCU-3) will be held from 2 to 4 November 2009
in Shanghai, China. Attached please find the first circular of the
conference. <br>
</b><br><br>
<b>WCU-3 will emphasize the institutional perspective in managing and
building world-class universities.</b> More specifically this should
reflect the following issues:
<ol>
<li> Strategic planning and leadership of elite higher education
institutions;
<li> Global market and institutional policies for the promotion of
academic talent;
<li> Quality assurance in the context of undergraduate and graduate
education;
<li> Institutional initiatives for research excellence and
innovation and technology;
<li> Institutional responses for accountability: internal evaluation
and benchmarking;
<li> Role of elite universities in national higher education and
research systems.
</ol>WCU-3 will include a special event during which will be presented by
Center for World-Class Universities of Shanghai Jiao Tong University the
following rankings:<br>
<br>
Academic Ranking of World Universities – 2009;<br>
Academic Ranking of World Universities by Broad Subject Fields
2009; and<br>
Academic Ranking of World Universities by Subject Fields – 2009
[new ranking by subject fields, proposed subject fields include
chemistry, physics, mathematics, computer science and engineering, and
economics].<br>
<br>
Participants interested in presenting a contribution on one of
above-mentioned topics are kindly asked to submit an abstract of up to
2,000 words by April 1, 2009. For further information, please look at our
meeting website:
<a href="http://gse.sjtu.edu.cn/WCU/WCU-3.htm">
http://gse.sjtu.edu.cn/WCU/WCU-3.htm</a><br><br>
Sincerely,<br><br>
Conference Secretariat<br>
Center for World-Class Universities<br>
Graduate School of Education<br>
Shanghai Jiao Tong University<br>
Shanghai, China<br><br>
Email: <a href="mailto:wcu@sjtu.edu.cn">wcu@sjtu.edu.cn</a> <br><br>
<img src="http://edm.hz-mr.com/pic/tu.gif" width=600 height=2579 alt="[]">
<br><br>
<img src="http://edm.hz-mr.com/edmtrace.aspx?TraceId=4f78fcf1-a0f0-4765-84af-4b549286460c" width=1 height=1 alt="[]">
</blockquote>===============================<br>
B) O artigo da Physics Today de dezembro de 2008 sobre as consequências
de uma guerra nuclear indiano-paquistanesa<br><br>
Environmental consequences of nuclear war<br><br>
A regional war involving 100 Hiroshima-sized weapons would pose a
worldwide threat due to ozone destruction and climate change. A
superpower confrontation with a few thousand weapons would be
catastrophic.<br><br>
Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock, and Richard P. Turco <br>
December 2008, page 37<br>
<br>
More than 25 years ago, three independent research groups made valuable
contributions to elaborating the consequences of nuclear warfare.1 Paul
Crutzen and John Birks proposed that massive fires and smoke emissions in
the lower atmosphere after a global nuclear exchange would create severe
short-term environmental aftereffects. Extending their work, two of us
(Toon and Turco) and colleagues discovered “nuclear winter,” which
posited that worldwide climatic cooling from stratospheric smoke would
cause agricultural collapse that threatened the majority of the human
population with starvation. Vladimir Aleksandrov and Georgiy Stenchikov
conducted the first general circulation model simulations in the USSR.
Subsequent investigations in the mid- and late 1980s by the US National
Academy of Sciences2 and the International Council of Scientific
Unions3,4 supported those initial studies and shed further light on the
phenomena involved. In that same period, Presidents Ronald Reagan and
Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the potential environmental damage attending
the use of nuclear weapons and devised treaties to reduce the numbers
from their peak in 1986—a decline that continues today. When the cold war
ended in 1992, the likelihood of a superpower nuclear conflict greatly
decreased. Significant arsenals remain, however, and proliferation has
led to several new nuclear states. Recent work by our colleagues and
us5–7 shows that even small arsenals threaten people far removed from the
sites of conflict because of environmental changes triggered by smoke
from firestorms. Meanwhile, modern climate models confirm that the 1980s
predictions of nuclear winter effects were, if anything, underestimates.8
<br><br>
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002 calls for the US
and Russia each to limit their operationally deployed warheads to
1700–2200 by December 2012. The treaty has many unusual features:
warheads, rather than delivery systems, are limited; verification
measures are not specified; permanent arsenal reductions are not
required; warheads need not be destroyed; either side may quickly
withdraw; and the treaty expires on the same day that the arsenal limits
are to be reached. Nevertheless, should the limits envisioned in SORT be
achieved and the excess warheads destroyed, only about 6% of the 70?000
warheads existing in 1986 would remain. Given such a large reduction, one
might assume a concomitant large reduction in the number of potential
fatalities from a nuclear war and in the likelihood of environmental
consequences that threaten the bulk of humanity. Unfortunately, that
assumption is incorrect. Indeed, we estimate that the direct effects of
using the 2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities.
The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human
population. <br><br>
Casualty and soot numbers<br><br>
Any of several targeting strategies might be employed in a nuclear
conflict. For example, in a “rational” war, a few weapons are deployed
against symbolically important targets. Conversely, a “counterforce” war
entails a massive attack against key military, economic, and political
targets. We consider a “countervalue” strategy in which urban areas are
targeted, mainly to destroy economic and social infrastructure and the
ability to fight and recover from a conflict. In any case, when the
conflict involves a large number of weapons, the distinction between
countervalue and counterforce strategies diminishes because military,
economic, and political targets are usually in urban areas. <br><br>
Box 1 on page 38 describes how we estimate casualties (fatalities plus
injuries) and soot (elemental carbon) emissions; figure 1 shows results.
The figure gives predicted casualties and soot injected into the upper
atmosphere from an attack on several possible target countries by a
regional power using 50 weapons of 15-kiloton yield, for a total yield of
0.75 megaton. The figure also provides estimates of the casualties and
soot injections from a war based on envisioned SORT arsenals. In the SORT
conflict, we assume that Russia targets 1000 weapons on the US and 200
warheads each on France, Germany, India, Japan, Pakistan, and the UK. We
assume the US targets 1100 weapons each on China and Russia. We do not
consider the 1000 weapons held in the UK, China, France, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and possibly North Korea. (Box 2 on page 40 provides
information on the world’s nuclear arsenals.) The war scenarios
considered in the figure bracket a wide spectrum of possible attacks, but
not the extremes for either the least or greatest damage that might
occur. <br>
<br>
Box 2 <br><br>
As figure 1 shows, a war between India and Pakistan in which each uses
weapons with 0.75-Mt total yield could lead to about 44 million
casualties and produce about 6.6 trillion grams (Tg) of soot. A SORT
conflict with 4400 nuclear explosions and 440-Mt total yield would
generate 770 million casualties and 180 Tg of soot. The SORT scenario
numbers are lower limits inasmuch as we assumed 100-kt weapons; the
average SORT yield would actually be larger. The results can be
relatively insensitive to the distribution of weapons strikes on
different countries because attacks on lower-population areas produce
decreased amounts of soot. For instance, 100 weapons targeted each on
France and Belgium leads to about the same amount of soot as 200 on
France alone. On the other hand, using fewer weapons on densely populated
regions such as in India and China would reduce soot generation.
<br><br>
The 4400 explosions that we considered are 1000 more than are possible
with the lower SORT limit. However, even if the US and Russia achieve
that lower limit, more probable weapons yields would produce soot
emissions and casualties similar to those just described. Because of
world urbanization, a SORT conflict can directly affect large
populations. For example, with 1000 weapons detonated in the US, 48% of
the total population and 59% of the urban population could fall within
about 5 km of ground zero; 20% of the total population and 25% of the
urban population could be killed outright, while an additional 16% of the
total population and 20% of the urban population could become injured.
<br><br>
<br>
Figure 2 <br>
Figure 2 illustrates how the number of casualties and fatalities and the
amount of soot generated in China, Russia, and the US rises with an
increasing number of 100-kt nuclear explosions. In generating the figure,
we assumed regions were targeted in decreasing order of population within
5.25 km of ground zero, as described in box 1. Attacks on China had the
most dire effects because China has many highly populated urban centers.
Indeed, attacks on a relatively small number of densely populated urban
targets generate most of the casualties and soot. For example, 50% of the
total soot produced by a 2000-weapon attack would result from 510
detonations on China, 547 on Russia, or 661 on the US. A single US
submarine carrying 144 warheads of 100-kt yield could generate about 23
Tg of soot and 119 million casualties in an attack on Chinese urban areas
or almost 10 Tg of soot and 42 million casualties in an attack on Russian
cities. <br><br>
In the late 1980s, Brian Bush, Richard Small, and colleagues assessed
soot emissions in a nuclear conflict.9 Their work, independent of the
studies with which two of us (Toon and Turco) were engaged, involved a
counterforce attack on the US by the USSR. They assumed 500-kt weapons
aimed at 3030 specific targets such as US Army, Navy, and Air Force
bases, fuel storage locations, refineries, and harbors, but not missile
silos or launch-control facilities. Cities were not explicitly attacked
in their counterforce scenario, but in the end, 50% of the US urban areas
were destroyed. <br><br>
Bush and colleagues estimated 37 Tg of smoke emissions, which contain not
only light-absorbing black soot but also nonabsorbing organics and other
compounds whose effects on climate are smaller than that of soot. Using
our methodology for estimating fire emissions, which includes accounting
for soot that is rained out, we calculate their result as being
equivalent to about 21 Tg of soot emission. In our simulated countervalue
attack with 1000 weapons of 100-kt yield, we found that 28 Tg of soot was
generated. Our burned area is somewhat larger, which accounts for the
greater soot emission. In short, both scenarios affect similar urban
areas and generate similar amounts of soot. <br><br>
However, Bush and colleagues assumed 3 times as many weapons and 15 times
the total explosive yield that we assumed. Because of multiple targeting
and overlap of detonation zones, their scenario has a built-in fire
ignition redundancy factor of about 8.7; our model has negligible
redundancy. In fact, their analysis of 3030 specific targets identified
only 348 unique, non-overlapping detonation sites in the US. That
substantial level of overkill is symptomatic of the enormous excesses of
weapons deployed by the superpowers in the 1980s. <br><br>
Environmental effects of soot<br><br>
Figure 3a <br><br>
Figure 3a indicates changes in global average precipitation and
temperature as a function of soot emission, as calculated with the help
of a modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A relatively modest 5
Tg of soot, which could be generated in an exchange between India and
Pakistan, would be sufficient to produce the lowest temperatures Earth
has experienced in the past 1000 years—lower than during the
post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the so-called year without a
summer. With 75 Tg of soot, less than half of what we project in a
hypothetical SORT war, temperatures would correspond to the last full Ice
Age, and precipitation would decline by more than 25% globally.
Calculations in the 1980s had already predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg
soot injection to be quite large.3 Our new results, however, show that
soot would rise to much higher altitudes than previously believed—indeed,
to well above the tops of the models used in the 1980s. As a result, the
time required for the soot mass to be reduced by a factor of e is about
five years in our simulations, as opposed to about one year as assumed in
the 1980s. That increased lifetime causes a more dramatic and
longer-lasting climate response. <br><br>
The temperature changes represented in figure 3a would have a profound
effect on mid- and high-latitude agriculture. Precipitation changes, on
the other hand, would have their greatest impact in the tropics.6 Even a
5-Tg soot injection would lead to a 40% precipitation decrease in the
Asian monsoon region. South America and Africa would see a large
diminution of rainfall from convection in the rising branch of the Hadley
circulation, the major global meridional wind system connecting the
tropics and subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulation’s dynamics can,
in general, affect climate on a global scale. <br><br>
Complementary to temperature change is radiative forcing, the change in
energy flux. Figure 3b shows how nuclear soot changes the radiative
forcing at Earth’s surface and compares its effect to those of two
well-known phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the
1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest in the 20th century.
Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the
energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient forcing from the Pinatubo eruption
peaked at about -4 W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One
implication of the figure is that even a regional war between India and
Pakistan can force the climate to a far greater degree than the
greenhouse gases that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable
future. Of course, the durations of the forcings are different: The
radiative forcing by nuclear-weapons-generated soot might persist for a
decade, but that from greenhouse gases is expected to last for a century
or more, allowing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing.
Accordingly, while the Ice Age–like temperatures in figure 3a could lead
to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snowpack, they probably would
not be persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets. <br>
<br>
Figure 4 <br><br>
Agriculture responds to length of growing season, temperature during the
growing season, light levels, precipitation, and other factors. The 1980s
saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a
nuclear war, but no such studies have been conducted using modern climate
models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of
the growing season—the time between freezing temperatures—for the second
summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.6,8 Even a 5-Tg soot
injection reduces the growing season length toward the shortest average
range observed in the midwestern US corn-growing states. Earlier studies
concluded that for a full-scale nuclear conflict, “What can be said with
assurance .?.?. is that the Earth’s human population has a much greater
vulnerability to the indirect effects of nuclear war [including damage to
the world’s agricultural, transportation, energy, medical, political, and
social infrastructure], especially mediated through impacts on food
productivity and food availability, than to the direct effects of nuclear
war itself.” As a result, “The indirect effects could result in the loss
of one to several billions of humans.”4 <br><br>
Because the soot associated with a nuclear exchange is injected into the
upper atmosphere, the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric
circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injection associated with a
regional conflict, stratospheric temperatures would remain elevated by 30
°C after four years.6–8 The resulting temperature and circulation
anomalies would reduce ozone columns by 20% globally, by 25–45% at middle
latitudes, and by 50–70% at northern high latitudes for perhaps as much
as five years, with substantial losses persisting for an additional five
years.7 The calculations of the 1980s generally did not consider such
effects or the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they focused on the
direct injection of nitrogen oxides by the fireballs of large-yield
weapons that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models have only
recently become capable of performing the sophisticated atmospheric
chemical calculations needed to delineate detailed ozone-depletion
mechanisms. Indeed, simulations of ozone loss following a SORT conflict
have not yet been conducted. <br><br>
Policy implications<br><br>
Scientific debate and analysis of the issues discussed in this article
are essential not only to ascertain the science behind the results but
also to create political action. Gorbachev, who together with Reagan had
the courage to initiate the builddown of nuclear weapons in 1986, said in
an interview at the 2000 State of the World Forum, “Models made by
Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in
a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on
Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of
honor and morality, to act in that situation.” Former vice president Al
Gore noted in his 2007 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, “More than two
decades ago, scientists calculated that nuclear war could throw so much
debris and soot into the air that it would block life-giving sunlight
from our atmosphere, causing a ‘nuclear winter.’ Their eloquent warnings
here in Oslo helped galvanize the world’s resolve to halt the nuclear
arms race.” <br><br>
Many researchers have evaluated the consequences of single nuclear
explosions, and a few groups have considered the results of a small
number of explosions. But our work represents the only unclassified study
of the consequences of a regional nuclear conflict and the only one to
consider the consequences of a nuclear exchange involving the SORT
arsenal. Neither the US Department of Homeland Security nor any other
governmental agency in the world currently has an unclassified program to
evaluate the impact of nuclear conflict. Neither the US National Academy
of Sciences, nor any other scientific body in the world, has conducted a
study of the issue in the past 20 years. <br><br>
That said, the science community has long recognized the importance of
nuclear winter. It was investigated by numerous organizations during the
1980s, all of which found the basic science to be sound. Our most recent
calculations also support the nuclear-winter concept and show that the
effects would be more long lasting and therefore worse than thought in
the 1980s. <br><br>
Nevertheless, a misperception that the nuclear-winter idea has been
discredited has permeated the nuclear policy community. That error has
resulted in many misleading policy conclusions. For instance, one
research group recently concluded that the US could successfully destroy
Russia in a surprise first-strike nuclear attack.10 However, because of
nuclear winter, such an action might be suicidal. To recall some
specifics, an attack by the US on Russia and China with 2200 weapons
could produce 86.4 Tg of soot, enough to create Ice Age conditions,
affect agriculture worldwide, and possibly lead to mass starvation.
<br><br>
Lynn Eden of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
explores the military view of nuclear damage in her book Whole World on
Fire.11 Blast is a sure result of a nuclear explosion. And military
planners know how to consider blast effects when they evaluate whether a
nuclear force is capable of destroying a target. Fires are collateral
damage that may not be planned or accounted for. Unfortunately, that
collateral damage may be capable of killing most of Earth’s population.
<br><br>
Climate and chemistry models have greatly advanced since the 1980s, and
the ability to compute the environmental changes after a nuclear conflict
has been much improved. Our climate and atmospheric chemistry work is
based on standard global models from NASA Goddard’s Institute for Space
Studies and from the US National Center for Atmospheric Research. Many
scientists have used those models to investigate climate change and
volcanic eruptions, both of which are relevant to considerations of the
environmental effects of nuclear war. In the past two decades,
researchers have extensively studied other bodies whose atmospheres
exhibit behaviors corresponding to nuclear winter; included in such
studies are the thermal structure of Titan’s ambient atmospheres and the
thermal structure of Mars’s atmosphere during global dust storms. Like
volcanoes, large forest fires regularly produce phenomena similar to
those associated with the injection of soot into the upper atmosphere
following a nuclear attack. Although plenty remains to be done, over the
past 20 years scientists have gained a much greater understanding of
natural analogues to nuclear-weapons explosions. <br><br>
Substantial uncertainties attend the analysis presented in this article;
references 5 and 8 discuss many of them in detail. Some uncertainties may
be reduced relatively easily. To give a few examples: Surveys of fuel
loading would reduce the uncertainty in fuel consumption in urban
firestorms. Numerical modeling of large urban fires would reduce the
uncertainty in smoke plume heights. Investigations of smoke removal in
pyrocumulus clouds associated with fires would reduce the uncertainty in
how much soot is actually injected into the upper atmosphere.
Particularly valuable would be analyses of agricultural impacts
associated with the climate changes following regional conflicts.
<br><br>
For any nuclear conflict, nuclear winter would seriously affect
noncombatant countries.12 In a hypothetical SORT war, for example, we
estimate that most of the world’s population, including that of the
Southern Hemisphere, would be threatened by the indirect effects on
global climate. Even a regional war between India and Pakistan, for
instance, has the potential to dramatically damage Europe, the US, and
other regions through global ozone loss and climate change. The current
nuclear buildups in an increasing number of countries point to conflicts
in the next few decades that would be more extreme than a war today
between India and Pakistan. The growing number of countries with weapons
also makes nuclear conflict more likely. <br><br>
The environmental threat posed by nuclear weapons demands serious
attention. It should be carefully analyzed by governments
worldwide—advised by a broad section of the scientific community—and
widely debated by the public. <br><br>
Much of the research we have summarized is based on computations done by
Charles Bardeen of casualties and the amount of soot generated in several
hypothetical nuclear attacks. We thank our colleagues Georgiy Stenchikov,
Luke Oman, Michael Mills, Douglas Kinnison, Rolando Garcia, and Eric
Jensen for contributing to the recent scientific investigation of the
environmental effects of nuclear conflict on which this paper is based.
This work is supported by NSF grant ATM-0730452. <br><br>
Brian Toon is chair of the department of atmospheric and oceanic sciences
and a member of the laboratory for atmospheric and space physics at the
University of Colorado at Boulder. Alan Robock is a professor of
atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Rich Turco is a professor of atmospheric science at the University of
California, Los Angeles.<br><br>
References<br>
1. P. J. Crutzen, J. W. Birks, Ambio 11, 114 (1982); R. P. Turco et al.,
Science 222, 1283 (1983) [INSPEC]; V. V. Aleksandrov, G. L. Stenchikov,
On the Modeling of the Climatic Consequences of the Nuclear War:
Proceedings on Applied Mathematics, Computing Center, USSR Academy of
Sciences, Moscow (1983). <br>
2. Committee on the Atmospheric Effects of Nuclear Explosions, The
Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange, National Academy
Press, Washington, DC (1985), available online at [Link]. <br>
3. A. B. Pittock et al., Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War:
Volume I: Physical and Atmospheric Effects, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York
(1989). <br>
4. M. A. Harwell, T. C. Hutchinson, Environmental Consequences of Nuclear
War: Volume II: Ecological and Agricultural Effects, 2nd ed., Wiley, New
York (1989). <br>
5. O. B. Toon et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys. 7, 1973 (2007). <br>
6. A. Robock et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys. 7, 2003 (2007). <br>
7. M. J. Mills et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 5307 (2008)
[INSPEC]. <br>
8. A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, J. Geophys. Res. 112, D13107
(2007) [SPIN]; doi:10.1029/2006JD008235. <br>
9. B. W. Bush et al., Nuclear Winter Source-Term Studies: Smoke Produced
by a Nuclear Attack on the United States, vol. 6, rep. no.
DNA-TR-86-220-V6, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA (1991); R. D.
Small, Ambio 18, 377 (1989). <br>
10. K. A. Lieber, D. Press, Int. Secur. 30(4), 7 (2006). <br>
11. L. Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear
Weapons Devastation, Cornell U. Press, Ithaca, NY (2003). <br>
12. C. Sagan, Foreign Aff. 62, 257 (1983/84). <br>
13. P. Miller, M. Mitchell, J. Lopez, Phys. Geog. 26, 85 (2005) . <br>
14. S. Glasstone, P. J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed.,
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